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ABSTRACT
System-call level audit logs often play a critical role in computer
forensics. They capture low-level interactions between programs
and users in much detail, making them a rich source of insight
on malicious user activity. However, using these logs to discover
and understand malicious activities from a typical computer that
produces more than 3GB of logs daily is both compute and time
intensive.
We introduce a graphical system for efficient loading, storing,
processing, querying, and displaying system events to support com-
puter forensics called GrAALF. In comparison to other related sys-
tems such as AIQL [13] and SAQL [12],GrAALF offers the flexibility
of multiple backend storage solutions, easy-to-use and intuitive
querying of logs, and the ability to trace back longer sequences
of system events in (near) real-time to help identify and isolate
attacks. Equally important, both AIQL and SAQL are not available
for public use, whereas GrAALF is open-source.
GrAALF offers the choice of compactly storing the logs in main
memory, in a relational database system, in a hybrid main memory-
database system, and a graph-based database. We compare the
responsiveness of each of these options, using multiple very large
system-call log files. Next, in multiple real-world attack scenarios,
we demonstrate the efficacy and usefulness of GrAALF in iden-
tifying the attack and discovering its provenance. Consequently,
GrAALF offers a robust solution for analysis of audit logs to support
computer forensics.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Provenance data contained in system logs offers a rich source of in-
formation for computer forensics. This is because the log data com-
prehensively represents how processes controlled by an attacker
interact with resources such as the disk and the network. System
events loggers such as Linux Audit [19], Sysdig [38], DTrace [1],
and Event Trace for Windows (ETW) [3] are often used to generate
these logs. Although computer forensics logs are frequently ana-
lyzed off-line after an attack has been performed, real-time system
monitoring can help the user in various ways. If forensic logs can
be analyzed in real-time, that rich source of information allows
investigation of ongoing abnormal behaviors and thus can protect
the system effectively. Also, timely attack investigation is essential
to protect the system from future similar attacks.
However, there exist three main challenges in developing a
practical system that can support (near) real-time analysis. First,
system logs grow rapidly. We observe that a single host gener-
ates more than 2.5 million system events in an hour. Other stud-
ies [14, 21, 27] also reported this problem. This challenge has moti-
vated previous research into both lossless and lossy compression of
logs [18, 27, 32, 39, 41] as well as optimizing querying and pattern
matching in these logs [12, 13].
Next, there exist various logging systems for different operating
systems and system architectures, but their definitions of the event
entries, as well as output formats, are often different. For instance,
Linux and Unix systems frequently use Linux Audit [19] to log sys-
tem events. On the other hand, Windows systems mostly use Event
Tracing for Windows (ETW) [3] to record system events, including
system calls andWindows API calls. Linux andWindows have com-
pletely different system calls and system APIs. Furthermore, recent
studies [5, 26, 34, 37] propose novel logging techniques to improve
the effectiveness and efficiency of computer forensics. For instance,
BEEP [26] proposes a technique to divide the long-running process
into a finer-grain system object called execution unit to improve
forensic accuracy. It is challenging to seamlessly support system
logs generated by various logging platforms because they have
different definitions of system objects, subjects, and relations.
Third, backward and forward tracking techniques [14, 21] are the
essential techniques for computer forensics to understand causal
relations between system objects (e.g., process) and subjects (e.g.,
file, network socket). However, they often require tracking back
to previous events to identify causal chains. In practice, database
solutions are often used to store sequences of system events, and
the user can compose queries to identify causal relations between
system components. However, we observe that today’s database
solutions cannot provide enough performance to process real-time,
streaming system events. In this study, we evaluate the insertion
and querying performance of relational and graph databases. We
observe that the relational databases show very good data insertion
performance; however, the response time of backtrack querying is
not acceptable. It can take more than 20 minutes to extract causal
relations of multiple files from a two-day audit log. On the other
hand, graph databases show good response times for the same
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backtrack query as they store such relations explicitly in a graph
format. However, the data insertion performance is not acceptable
for processing real-time system events.
In this paper we present GrAALF, a graphical system for effi-
cient loading, storing, processing, querying, and displaying system
events to support computer forensics. GrAALF effectively facili-
tates forensic analysis in a large enterprise.
GrAALF flexibly offers the options of compressed in-memory
storage, a traditional relational database system, and a graph data-
base for storing the parsed audit logs. Though relational databases
are highly optimized for the storage of tabular data, they may not
perform well in cases with a large number of chained joins. This
slows down those operations that require an event stored in the
database to be backtracked to its origin. On the other hand, graph
databases are designed with relationships in mind, making them
much more efficient for backtracking relationships between events
in a security log. However, graph databases tend to have low inser-
tion performances, due to which they are unable to keep up with
high-speed streams of logged data. Consequently, graph databases
and in-memory storage are well suited for (near) real-time forensics
when mini-batches of data are inserted and fast query execution
on graphs is needed. For post-mortem analyses, the relational data-
base is more appropriate as it allows fast loading, indexing, and
subsequent querying of huge amounts of log data.
GrAALF allows stored audit logs to be queried using a simple
query language whose syntax and semantics are close to those of
SQL. Importantly, and unlike SQL, this query language supports
path queries and backtracking to an arbitrary depth from an identi-
fied resource. We note that this latter functionality is particularly
crucial for successful forensics of popular computer attacks such
as data exfiltration and kernel injections. User queries are parsed
and interpreted by GrAALF’s query and visualization layer; then
the satisfying data is displayed as a color-coded graph or tree that
can be rearranged, focused, and magnified for study.
GrAALF belongs to a growing family of systems that support
forensic analysis, which include Elastic [7], AIQL [13], SAQL [12],
and Loglens [10]. However, these previous systems support simple
keyword- and regular-expression based log data filtering only, and
do not offer the useful backward trace query functionality. Fur-
thermore, systems such as AIQL and SAQL are proprietary and
not available for public use, in contrast with GrAALF, which is
open-source and free 1.
We evaluate GrAALF on a very large system call audit log of
a real-world attack. We explore the performances of the various
storage options as logs of increasing sizes are processed. Next, we
report on the time taken to execute various types of queries that
are relevant for forensics, including those involving substantial
backtracking. Our experiments reveal that GrAALF scales linearly
with the number of records processed and also demonstrate queries
for which one storage option is better than others. Finally, we
briefly discuss a few case studies that illustrate the pragmatic use
of GrAALF in computer forensics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we
present a high-level overview of GrAALF. We describe details of
three core layers of GrAALF in the next three sections; we discuss
1 https://github.com/omid-s/cyber_deception
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Figure 1: A high level overview of GrAALF.
the log ingestion layer in Section 3, the log storage layer in Section
4, and the query and visualization layer in Section 5. In section 6,
we use large, real-world system logs to demonstrate the practical
utility of GrAALF. We summarize related work in Section 7 and
Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 OVERVIEW OF GRAALF
We illustrate the high-level overview of GrAALF in Fig. 1. GrAALF
consists of three layers: log ingestion, log storage, and query and
visualization layers. The log ingestion layer receives streaming
system logs from hosts in the enterprise and processes them. The
output of this layer will be formatted data that represent causal
relations between system subjects (e.g., process, thread) and objects
(e.g., file, network socket).
The log storage layer stores the output from the log ingestion
layer into a permanent database.We support both relational databases
and graph databases and allow a user to choose which storage
method is appropriate. We design in-memory buffer storage to
enable the processing of enormous streaming data from multiple
sources. This layer also handles user queries. It consistently passes
sophisticated user queries to the corresponding storage method,
including in-memory buffers and permanent databases. The output
from various databases are seamlessly stitched in this layer and
delivered to the upper layer.
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type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1550115072.442:35566351): 
syscall=1 success=yes exit=128 a0=4 a1=1669150 
a2=128 ppid=29447 pid=49025 auid=1003 uid=1003 
gid=1003 euid=1003 comm=“vsftpd“
type=PATH: name="/usr/password" inode=18957
vsftpd
(pid:49025)
file:/usr/password, 
inode=18957
type:write, ret:128
time:2/14/19, 3:31:12
(a) “write” system call (b) Graph representation
Figure 2: System call event and graph representation.
firefox
(pid:13275)
File:/tmp/firefox/H345, 
inode=36994
firefox
(pid:13278)
firefox
(pid:13280)type:clone
time:2/14/19, 3:30:13
type:clone
time:2/14/19, 3:30:12
exeunit1.1
exeunit1.2
type:exeunit create 
time:2/14/19, 3:30:13
type:exeunit create 
time:2/14/19, 3:30:15
type:read, ret:68 
time:2/14/19, 3:31:19
Figure 3: Representing a new type of subject, execution unit.
The query and visualization layer interacts with a user to receive
queries and provide output as an interactive graph. The user can
iteratively pose queries based on the prior output graphs. The
output graph visualizes causal relations in the system elements as
well as interactions between different machines. More importantly,
GrAALF supports (near) real-time backward and forward queries
through which the user can easily understand the origin of each
system component and how one affects other components. We
carefully design the storage layer and query interpreter for querying
in-memory storage with the permanent database seamlessly. As
soon as the ingestion layer processes the logs and delivers the
output to in-memory storage, they are ready for querying.
The query and visualization layer also accepts queries to monitor
the system for both stability and security purposes; this module
will continuously monitor graphs produced by these queries and
will notify the user when changes happen in any of them. This
enables automated monitoring as well as automated detection of
potential security incidents as they happen.
3 LOG INGESTION LAYER
System logs collected from hosts in the enterprise are streamed
to GrAALF’s log ingestion layer. This layer contains diverse log
handlers to support various types of system logs from different plat-
forms. For instance, most distributions of Linux and Unix systems
use Linux Audit tool [19] to monitor system events such as system
calls that reveal causal relations between system objects (e.g., pro-
cess or thread) and subjects (e.g., file, network socket). On the other
hand, Windows platforms mostly use Event Tracing for Windows
(ETW) [3] for system monitoring by intercepting system calls along
with Windows API calls. DTrace [1] is another popular tool that
supports multiple platforms, including Linux, BSD, Solaris, and
Windows. Commercial tools, such as Sysdig [38] and Dynatrace [2],
are also available. Also, various approaches [5, 26, 34, 37] have
proposed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of computer
forensics.
Our main design goal in this layer is to provide extensibility
and pluggability in the system. We aim to support any types of
log events that can be represented as object nodes, subject nodes,
and their relation edges. For example, Fig. 2 (a) shows a system
call event in Linux where a process “vsftpd” with pid 49025 reads
a file “\etc\password” with inode 18957. This event is converted
to a graph representation, as shown in Fig. 2 (b). Nodes contain
information about the process and the file while the edges show
how they are causally linked. In this manner, any system events that
can be represented as graph nodes and causal relations between
them can be ingested by GrAALF.
Fig. 3 demonstrates how GrAALF can support a new form of
system objects and subjects. A series of recent studies [25, 26, 31]
demonstrates that default system logging approaches suffer from
the dependency explosion problem mainly due to long-running,
event-handling processes. Process execution partitioning techniques [25,
26, 30–32] have been proposed to address the dependency explo-
sion by introducing fine-grained system objects, called execution
units, for both Windows and Linux platforms. In this example, we
adopt an execution unit as another type of system object. Addition-
ally, we introduce an edge from a thread which includes the target
execution unit to represent the relation between the two. This edge
contains a timestamp of the unit’s creation time. Fig. 3 shows that
the Firefox process with pid 13275 spawns two threads, 13278 and
13280, and 13278 creates two execution units and unit1.1 reads a
file. In this way, a user can easily add system objects and subjects
by adding a definition of a new node, its fields, and edges from/to
existing subjects and/or objects.
In this project, we implement the following three log handlers
to process logs created by different systems:
• Audit Loghandler processes logs generated by LinuxAudit [19].
It mainly contains system call events that contain process infor-
mation (e.g., pid, parent process, user id, binary path, etc), system
object information (e.g., file name, inode, network socket address,
child process information, etc), and the description of event (e.g.,
system call number, arguments, return value, timestamp, etc).
The format of Linux Audit log is a key-value pair record that
directly derives from system call arguments, so it often only pro-
vides a file descriptor instead of file name, path, inode, or network
socket information. To address this we maintain file open tables
for each process to map file information, including an absolute
path and inode, with a corresponding file descriptor. These tables
are populated when we observe file open or other system calls
that can manipulate the open file table (e.g., dup call to duplicate
the open file descriptor). Then our handler converts an event
into a graph format where subjects and objects become graph
nodes, and an edge describes their relations and sends it to the
storage layer. Additionally, we support modified Audit modules
by [26, 31] to include execution unit objects. We follow the same
definition of execution units and unit dependency as the original
author described in [26], and we maintain unit tables for each
thread to identify the parent thread that created the execution
unit and also maintain the memory dependencies with other
execution units.
• Sysdig handler handles logs generated by Sysdig system moni-
tor [38]. Sysdig supports Linux, MacOS, and Windows. Similar to
Linux Audit, Sysdig records system calls events. We support both
output formats from Sysdig: json and plain text. Unlike Linux
Audit, Sysdig provides target file and network information along
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with file descriptor number; that reduces our burden, so we can
directly convert Sysdig logs into our graph format.
• CSV handler is a generic log processing module we provide
where the user can define fields in a CSV (comma-separated value)
header. We believe supporting CSV format is particularly useful
because CSV is a well-known and popular format for storing
and sharing data. It is easy to define the nodes, their fields, and
relations between them in the CSV header, and it helps to map
data in the CSV to the internal object structure.
If a user desires to use a custom logging system, 1) they can use
CSV as an output format that GrAALF can directly handle, or 2)
they can implement a new handler that can parse events and pass
the graph representation to GrAALF. Specifically, for each event,
at least one object is required. Multiple objects and/or multiple
subjects can exist in a single event. Each object and subject (i.e., node
in a graph representation) has a unique signature (e.g., process id,
file inode, etc) and unlimited fields for detailed information. These
can be employed for user querying. An event can be represented
as a directed edge between the object and the subject. There is
no required field for edges, but we highly recommend providing
a timestamp for each event to accurately identify indirect causal
relations. For example, assume that process A reads file1 and then
writes file2. After that, process A reads file3. We can infer that file2
might be causally related to file1 through process A. However, read
events of file3 happen after the write event, and thus there are no
causal relations between file2 and file3. If we do not have timestamps
in the edge, we conservatively conclude that both file1 and file3
(potentially) affect file2, and this causes a false dependence.
4 LOG STORAGE LAYER
GrAALF’s log storage layer consists of two components: tempo-
rary in-memory storage and permanent database. We consider two
popular back-end storage systems: table-based relational database
and graph-based database systems. For the relational database, we
mainly use PostgreSQL in this paper butGrAALF also fully supports
mysql databases and it can easily be extended to support Microsoft
SQL Server and Oracle with minimal query adjustments. While
most traditional database implementations support de facto SQL
language, newly emerging graph databases[6, 11] do not have a
standard language. We use Neo4j as a backend graph database and
GrAALF works well with Neo4j’s Cypher[35] query language. We
believe GrAALF can be extended to support other graph databases
compatible with Cypher, but we do not guarantee that. To sup-
port a new graph database, GrAALF requires a certain amount of
modification to adopt the new structures and query language.
We design this layer to support both relational databases (e.g.,
PostgreSQL) and graph databases (e.g., Neo4j) as backend storage
systems. In addition to offering flexibility to the user to choose the
favorite database system as backend storage, we show performance
evaluations of each database that can help a user to choose the right
one for their environment.
In general, queries about causal relationships between system
subjects and objects perform better in a graph database because it
does not require frequent table joins in processing the query. Graph
databases directly store the relationships as edges between nodes
and thus perform well in computer forensics. We measure querying
performance with the following two scenarios:
• A forensic query from the user that returns an empty result. This
query causes the database to scan the whole dataset but does not
track any causal relationships.
• A forensic query to backtrack the lineage of all files in /home/
directory. This query causes the database to iteratively track
causal relations for each file in /home/. The output graphs contain
all system nodes that directly or indirectly affect each file.
In this experiment, we use a real-world system log that we col-
lect from a single host for 48 hours. The log is recorded by Linux
Audit [19] that runs on top of Ubuntu-16.04. We execute each query
with various sizes of datasets and measure the response time. Fig. 4a
shows the performance when we execute the first query, which
yields empty output. The performance of both databases is roughly
linear to the size of the dataset. In this evaluation, we do not ob-
serve any noticeable differences between PostgreSQL and Neo4j.
Fig. 4b shows the performance of the backtrack query. It shows that
the graph database (i.e., Neo4j) performs better for the query that
requires tracking relationships.
On the other hand, considering data insertion performance,
graph databases do not scale well with a large stream of data. In
this experiment, we use real-world system logs that we collect from
a single host for 48 hours. The same as the previous experiment,
we use the real-world system log recorded by Linux Audit [19]. We
insert system events in the log to each database according to the cor-
responding timestamp. Fig. 5a shows the insertion delay caused by
each database. PostgreSQL can ingest all events without noticeable
delay. However, Neo4j shows a severe delay. For instance, many
events have to wait in the queue for more than 20 minutes. Fig. 5b
shows the length of the insertion queue required to process all
events for each database. After 32 hours of the experiments, Neo4j
requires more than 2 million additional insertions to handle the
logs from a single host, and it rapidly grows. It clearly shows that
Neo4j does not provide enough insertion performance to handle
real-world system events.
Note that in our evaluations, we do not try to configure or opti-
mize each database; instead, we use default configuration to show
how they perform with the forensics queries as well as insertion of
system event data. For instance, both databases provide tools that
can drastically speed up the insertions by potentially sacrificing
the reliability of data. Neo4j offers a tool called batch insert that
can significantly improve insertion speed, but it bypasses multi-
ple layers of validations and thus could lead to inconsistencies in
the final database. Additionally, there exist studies [12, 13, 17] that
suggest methods for indexing and optimizing the data in different
databases. Recently proposed high-performance databases [33] can
be used as well, but that is out of our scope in this project.
4.1 In-memory Storage
To address the insertion delay observed in Neo4j and enable real-
time querying for streaming inputs, we design and implement an
in-memory storage system that can 1) maintain pending insertions
in the system, 2) provide multiple graph compression techniques,
3) support seamlessly integrated querying between in-memory and
database storage.
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Figure 5: Insertion performance comparison between Neo4j and Postgres
First,GrAALF’s in-memory storage acts as an event buffer where
events can be queued and wait for insertion into the backend data-
base. Note that the user can query all events stored in the in-memory
storage. After an event is inserted into the backend, we keep it in the
in-memory storage only if the system has enough memory space
for better querying performance. We discuss details of in-memory
querying in the next section.
Next, we introduce three graph compression techniques to re-
duce storage cost and improve querying and insertion performance.
All compressions are done while the events are stored in the in-
memory storage to improve insertion performance as well as to
save storage in the backend database. We have four options, as
follows:
• No Compression (C0): This method returns all edges along
with all of their metadata. We call it no-compression or C0. For
instance, assume the system call event that Execution Unit (E1.1)
reads File ’/tmp/firefox/H345’ (F1) 3 times. Three read events will
be stored as separate edges.
• Lossless Compression (C1): This approach merges all edges if
their object node, subject node, and the relation type are the same.
We merge edges into a single edge but keep all fields, including
time stamps, in order to preserve all of the information that
each edge contains. With this approach, the output graph has
fewer edges but the quality of information is the same as in C0.
Applying C1 to the previous example, we merge all 3 edges into
one but keep 3 timestamps.
• Keeping Forensic Accuracy (C2): This compression level also
merges edges if their object, subject, and relation type are the
same. However, unlike C1, we only keep the details of the first
and last edges. With C2 used on the previous example, we merge
3 edges into one and keep only the first and last timestamps.
This approach will lose some information (e.g., number of events
between E1.1 and F1, total bytes that E1.1 reads from F1, etc)
but we maintain the accuracy of backward and forward tracking
output.
• Lossy Compression (C3): In this case, we keep the first edge
and discard following edges if they have the same object, subject,
and relation type. This approach will lose most of the ordering in
events but still keeps the high-level causal relationship between
nodes. More importantly, there is a chance that C3 causes bogus
causality (i.e., false positives). For example, assume that E1.1
reads from F1 and later on, E2.2 writes to F1. With C0, C1, and
C2, we can clearly tell that E1.1 read F1 before E2.2writes F1, and
thus, E1.1 is not affected by E2.2’s write event. On the other hand,
if we adopt C3, we do not have enough information about which
event happens before the other, and we should conservatively
assume that E1.1 might be affected by E2.2 via F1. This is a false
causality introduced by the lossy compression.
In this project, we use all four compression levels to evaluate the
insertion performance and at runtime we allow the user to choose
the compression level to use. We recommend C1 or C2 for most
cases because C1 has the same quality of information as C0 with
better performance, and C3 can cause false dependencies[29]. In
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File:/tmp/firefox/H345, 
inode=36994exeunit1.1
type:read, ret:68 
time:2/14/19, 3:31:19
type:read, ret:190 
time:2/14/19, 3:31:24
type:read, ret:12 
time:2/14/19, 3:31:28
File:/tmp/firefox/H345, 
inode=36994exeunit1.1
type:read, 
time:2/14/19, 3:31:28 | time:2/14/19, 3:31:24 | time:2/14/19, 3:31:19
File:/tmp/firefox/H345, 
inode=36994exeunit1.1
type:read, 
time:2/14/19, 3:31:28 | time:2/14/19, 3:31:19
File:/tmp/firefox/H345, 
inode=36994exeunit1.1
type:read, 
time:2/14/19, 3:31:19
C0
C1
C2
C3
Figure 6: Shows different compression modes - C0 keeps all
edges with all theirmeta information, C1 will merge similar
edges but keeps all timestamps, C2 keeps only the first and
last timestamp, C3 keeps only the first timestamp.
addition to that, we provide two query modes: normal and verbose.
In verbose mode, each event will be represented using a single
unique edge so that C1’s verbose output is the same as C0. The
normal mode groups similar edges into one to make the resulting
graph more readable. Furthermore, we plan to adopt recent log
reduction techniques [18, 27, 32, 41] intoGrAALF as a part of graph
creation or as an independent system to further reduce the size of
the forensics graph. Fig. 6 shows the four compression models.
Fig. 8 shows insertion performance with different levels of com-
pression. X-axis shows the event arrival time and Y-axis presents
the time when the event is consumed by GrAALF. The dotted line
shows the event arrival speed. If the insertion performance graph
is above the dotted line, it means the processing is slower than
the event arrival speed. If the performance graph lies below the
dotted line, the processing speed is faster than event arrival and
thus, acceptable for real-time event processing. As shown in Fig. 8,
Neo4j alone is not acceptable for real-time event processing. Our
in-memory storage with all compression levels can handle the data
faster than event arrival speed and the performance of C1, C2, and
C3 do not show much difference. In-memory storage with com-
pressions can improve PostgreSQL’s insertion performance a little,
but it is already faster than event arrival speed. We do not show
PostgreSQL results for better readability.
Fig. 7 shows the amount of memory consumed by the in-memory
storage process when we use C2 compression. It includes the space
for graph buffer as well as the space for compression operations. The
process occupies a large amount of memory for the compression
and frequently garbage collects to release the memory that is not
required anymore, and that is the reason why the graph fluctuates
heavily.
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4.2 Graph Database Backend
GrAALF supports the storage of its graph in a graph database. To
store records in a backend data store, and to minimize the memory
used to keep them, we turn each record read from input into a
small graph; the format of the log determines the size of this small
graph. For example, if the graph is formatted as object affects subject
in each record; then, the subject and object will be considered as
nodes and "effect" will be represented as an edge. The created small
graph structure is then passed to the graph database using a query
that will first ensure the nodes do not already exist in the graph
and then will insert them; any preexisting node will be kept to
preserve space and queryability. Edge insertion, on the other hand,
depends on the compression configurations. If C0 is selected, every
edge is inserted in the database. However, with higher compression
levels an edge is inserted only once, and future occurrences of the
same edge are considered updates that will make changes to the
time stamps on the first edge. GrAALF maintains a buffer of all
the pending insertions. Buffer also checks all nodes and edges and
prevents adding a node that already exists to the queue; this reduces
the number of queries sent to the database.
In order to improve insertion performances, multiple backend
databases can be utilized, each with data for a particular time win-
dow. This will improve insertion performance.
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4.3 Relational Database Backend
GrAALF’s relational data module supports PostgreSQL and MySQL
database servers as a tabular back end. Relational databases can be
used in two forms, 1) the flat tabular format, 2) the two-table graph
format. In order to store data in a flat tabular format, we use one
table with as many fields as in the internal record object. This opens
room for direct storage and retrieval of those records; on the other
hand, this comes at storage cost as some of the information will
be copied multiple times. Also, as we will show in the evaluation
sections, querying information from a relational database for longer
backtracking tasks is more time consuming compared to running
the same query in a graph database. To store logs in the flat format,
each record passed to the storage module from the reader modules
will turn into an insert query for one record with all of its fields
that have values.
The two-table graph model is implemented using two tables in a
relational database: a vertex table and an edge table. The creation
of the nodes and edges happens the same as in the graph database
backend, but nodes are inserted into the vertex table and edges are
inserted in the edge table. Queries sent to the backend for retrieving
data in this format have both a higher number and more complexity
than the graph database counterparts.
5 QUERY AND VISUALIZATION LAYER
5.1 Query language
GrAALF’s query language supports projection and filtering. The
returned graph always starts from the nodes specified by the filter
criteria and then applies the edge criteria if applicable.
The general structure of our query language is as follows :
[verbose] [[back]/[forward]] select * ,[ Projection of Edge Types
] from *,[ projection of Node Types] [where [[field] [operator]
[value]] ] [;]
• [Projection of edge types]: this option is either * for all, or is
a selection of event types for edges. For instance, if the dataset
represents system call events, edge types can be one or more
system calls (e.g., read, write, open, execve) that the user wants
to track.
• [Projection of node types]: this option is either * for all, or is a
selection of nodes (i.e., system objects and subjects). For instance,
file, process, socket, pipe, can all be types of nodes for the system
call datasets.
• [[field] [operator] [value]]: these parameters can be any of
the types described in the projection of node section. This part is
optional, as you can skip it or use ‘any’ to consider all types in the
query processing. [field] can be any field of a node. For example,
‘pid’ for a process id, ‘name’ for a process name, and ‘uid’ for a
user id who launches the process can be used to selectively track
process nodes in system call events. [operator] can be ‘is’, ‘>’, ‘<’
or ‘has’ for exact matches or the ‘contains’ operator; arguments
to the “has” keyword can also be regular expressions as long
as they conform to POSIX standard. Different criteria including
“,and,”; “,or," logical operators are also supported.
For instance, if a user wants to identify all sources that affect a file
“/etc/active_users.txt”, they can compose the following backtrack
query:
back select * from * where filename is ‘/etc/active_users.txt’
Similar to other query languages, users can also issue queries to
get or set environment variables and configurations. These envi-
ronment variables include: the maximum number of edges forward
or backward tracking will explore; whether to force the system to
merge a new output into the previous graph; and display details of
query execution including the execution status of the storage layer
and back-end database.
Users may choose to see the resulting graph in normal or verbose
mode. Normal mode will group edges of a similar type between the
same nodes, and this will produce a more straightforward graph
for better readability. On the other hand, the verbose mode can
be activated by adding “verbose” keyword to the beginning of the
query to create separate edges for each type of relation.
Output graphs can be exported to various formats. We currently
support textual description, JSON format, and DOT, and GrAALF
can be extended to new formats. This is useful to use the output
from GrAALF in other tools for further analysis. The “describe”
keyword can be used in a query to include textual description of
the output graph. The output will be the list of events that can
be sorted by time or any fields. Sort can be selected by issuing an
“orderby=[field]” keyword in the describe query. A user can use
“format=” keyword to determine the output format including ‘text’,
‘json’ or ‘dot’.
5.2 Query Interpreter
GrAALF translates a user query into one or more queries and
fetches the corresponding data from in-memory storage and back-
end databases in the log storage layer. When a user issues a query
viaGrAALF’s console, our query execution engine parses the query
and decides whether the query is a configuration query which will
make changes to program settings or if it is a query to fetch data
from the forensics graph. Configuration queries will be sent to
the configuration manager who is in charge of maintaining the
parameters and configurations of GrAALF. Data-fetch queries will
be routed to their corresponding module based on the selected
back-end. This module runs as a separate thread to allow the user
to interact with GrAALF’s console while the previous query is be-
ing processed. As different backend databases use different query
languages, we support both SQL-based and Neo4j’s Cypher query
languages. Regardless of the specific language used, we implement
highly optimized in-memory query processing to allow the user to
investigate real-time events.
5.2.1 In-memory Storage. This is the primary area in which we
process the query. All incoming queries are analyzed here and
outputs are quickly generated if the query can be fully answered
without accessing backend databases. If it is required to access a
backend database, we create queries according to the backend data-
base types (e.g., graph or relational DB). All outputs from backend
databases will be transferred into in-memory storage and seam-
lessly correlated into a single graph. This allows GrAALF to reduce
graph construction efforts in other modules, while also providing a
single interface to other modules to be able to consume the data.
The in-memory graph module maintains three hash maps which
are used to create indexes on nodes and edges. One map contains
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information in a nested map model which starts with node type and
then is mapped by their identifier. Another map uses a combination
of identifiers from vertices to identify edges between every two
nodes. The last hashmapmaintains a title-based map of the vertices;
this will help with resolving regular expression and title matching
queries faster. Select queries will start based on their criteria; e.g. if
the user is looking for processes, the search navigates to the type
hashmap, finds processes, and then looks for title matches. If no title
is expressed in the query, all nodes in that type will be considered.
To lookup nodes based on their titles however, the search starts
from the title hash map by finding keys that match the criteria and
then processing their values. Edge selection happens after nodes
are selected. To find edges we pick all combinations of two nodes
and go through each, finding their corresponding edges from the
edge map based on the combined identifiers of the nodes. If this
search yields any results, those edges will be evaluated against edge
criteria in the input query; e.g. if the user is asking for write system
calls, returned edges should have write set as their system call. This
helps efficiently find the desired nodes while maintaining a small
overhead of nodes.
Back select queries start with a select query which finds the leaf
nodes in the final graph; these nodes will be the nodes the user
wants to backtrack from. Then a Breadth First Search traversal is
performed on the forensics graph, backtracking from those nodes.
After the first layer, all nodes will have only one parent; while
many processes might access one file or socket, a process cannot
be created by more than one process. This assumption makes back
tracking significantly faster as there is no need to do redundant
lookups, and many graph paths converge to processes like ‘initd‘ or
remote access clients like ‘sshd‘. Forward select queries are designed
to see the effects one node has on other nodes. Like back selects,
forward selects start with a selection of the initial nodes in question
using a select query. Once the initial nodes (root or roots) are found,
BFS will be performed on the nodes, following them level by level.
Breadth First Search is chosen as a uniform search strategy in graph
traversals for two main reasons: 1) each record in a log input will
contain information about multiple levels of the graph. Thus DFS
has a higher chance of performing redundant queries. 2) especially
in backtracking, the parents will be a line graph starting from the
first of the second layer after the initial nodes. While this could
benefit either DFS or BFS, we stay with BFS throughout GrAALF to
keep the model consistent. Once the nodes are explored, all nodes
will be listed and their connecting edges will be added to the final
graph from the edges map following the supplied edge filter criteria.
To maintain the final results of queries as a graph data structure as
well as its presentation, we leveraged JUNG [36] which provides
a lightweight wrapper and user interface presentation for graphs
and networks.
5.2.2 Relational Database. Similar to in-memory storage, once the
input query is parsed and the parent module handles configuration
queries, the SQL module will look for the identified nodes in the
database. If process information is given as a criterion, then process,
parent process, and ancestor process fields are considered in the
initial query and they are fetched. When criteria are provided for a
socket or file, file descriptor fields are the main source of filtering in
the query. By default, GrAALF stops running user queries with no
criteria; this is because real life logs will flood the memory and the
output will be partial, thus it cannot be accurate or trusted. In order
to stop the misconceptions that would be caused by such skewed
results, we stop such queries before running them. Select queries
will stop at this stage; all nodes that have been discovered will be
sent to the memory module to create the final filtered graph. Once
seed nodes are discovered for a back select query, BFS is performed
on the database following the trace. As mentioned in the previous
section, each record contains information about the file or socket
as well as its process, parent process, and ancestor process; thus
each fetched record will create between one and four layers of
depth in the final graph. For each new level in the graph, a new
query is created and executed until there are no more layers in the
graph to follow. While this requires many queries, GrAALF tries
to lessen this workload by merging queries for different paths in
each layer into one query to minimize the round trip times and
transaction creation overheads. Forward select queries are handled
in the same way as back selects, except that in a forward select the
maximum output degree of nodes is not one. To handle forward
queries, GrAALF runs the initial query to find the seed nodes. Then
it will run BFS for the children of those nodes.
5.2.3 Graph Database. This module is the simplest among the
query modules described. A graph database will already have the
data stored in a graph model; thus there is no need for tediously
repeated queries. The graph-based module acts as an intermedi-
ary and will translate the user query into Cypher queries. Cypher
queries are sent to the Neo4j database, and the returned records
are formed into a graph which will be appended to the existing
graph in the memory. Most GrAALF queries are translated into
one optimized Cypher statement. Internal mechanisms of the graph
database are trusted to be optimal when backtracking on paths
of arbitrary lengths, thus no particular graph traversal method is
applied in their case.
6 CASE STUDIES
In this section, we discuss a few example scenarios to show the
practical utility of GrAALF.
6.1 Observation of Forensic Graph
In this section, we collect system logs from a real-world Linux device
and discuss how the forensic graph evolves. In this experiment, a
graduate student used a Linux desktop for typical daily work for
48 hours. The user heavily used Firefox web browser for surfing
of various websites. The user also frequently used text editors, a
compiler, and productivity software working with documents and
worksheets.
To understand how forensic graphs evolve, we choose a subset
of the data to study. We compose a query to identify all sources
of files in the home directory (/home/ ). For each of these files, we
count the number of related nodes and edges. We further execute
backward tracking on all the nodes found in /home/ to find how
their connectivity changes over time. We count the number of
nodes and edges for every 1,000 new event arrivals. Fig. 9 shows
the trend. Increasing connectivity is shown by the number of new
edges introduced to the graph. The number of nodes increases as
well, and that shows that the number of system subjects and objects
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Figure 9: The number of edges and nodes in a forensics
graph for files in /home/ directory on a Linux machine.
related to the target files increases over time. While the data we
consider in this experiment is only a subset of the system logs, we
choose the home directory as a considerable number of processes
store files there and make changes to it. Also, most files the user
touches are stored under the home directory, and we believe it
shows the characteristics of regular user activity.
6.2 Case Studies
In this section, we use three scenarios to demonstrate the practical
usability of GrAALF.
6.2.1 Background. In this study, we use two realistic cyberattacks
produced by the red team from the DARPA Transparent Computing
program [9]. The system log contains over 5 billion records from
multiple servers and desktop environments. We demonstrate three
cases in which GrAALF can help to investigate cyberattacks, as
well as real-time monitoring tasks for early detection of malicious
activities. As follows, we use two attack investigation scenarios and
one system monitoring case:
• Attack Investigation 1 : A user is investigating a data exfiltra-
tion attack. The attacker logs into the system via ssh and transfers
an important file to a remote host using csp process.
• Attack Investigation 2 : This attack involves a known backdoor
in a vsftp server application. The backdoor opens on a known port
when login into the FTP server is attempted using any user name
including a smiley face sequence of ‘:)’. The attacker exploits
the backdoor functionality to drop a shell script that causes the
server to restart.
• System Monitoring : A system administrator is monitoring the
system to check whether any process has been executed from an
executable file that was downloaded through the network in the
last 24 hours.
6.2.2 Data Exfiltration Attack. At the time of computer forensics
work, the user has already been informed that an exfiltration attack
has occurred. Thus the first step will be to find which important
files have been exfiltrated. Fig. 10 shows the steps which the user
needs to follow in order to trace the attack.
• Step 1. The user tries to find what file/files have been accessed
during the given period. Running the first query will return a list
Q1: select * from file where name has /important-files/
Q2: back select * from * where name is /important-files/plan-file.cad ;
Q3: forward select * from soc where name is scp and pid is 4667 ;
Figure 10: A set of queries used for data exfiltration attack.
of nodes in an important directory - for simplicity, we assume
‘important files‘ - and the user then decides which files to track.
• Step 2. Next, the user will be interested in discovering what hap-
pened to the files by backtracking from them. Back select will
provide the user with a hierarchy of processes that lead to ac-
cessing the file/files in question.
• Step 3. The user has noticed a suspicious process (eg. the user sees
an scp process in the back select from the last query). In order
to determine where the file has been sent to, the third query is
used; this query will show the remote IP in question.
The final graph from the above 3 steps is shown in Fig. 11. Node
colors represent the step at which the node has been added to the
graph: red nodes are added in step 1, followed by white nodes and
then gray nodes.
6.2.3 FTP Backdoor Attack. The user has seen a sudden restart in
the system after admins are notified that a new shell file is found
in the home directory; this information and the logs are passed to
the forensics expert. The following steps show how the attack can
be traced back to its source:
• Step 1. The expert locates the shell file by executing the command
‘select * from * where name is myshell.sh‘
• Step 2. The expert performs a back select from the file to see
what processes led to the creation of the file. ‘back select * from
* where name is myshell.sh‘
• Step 3. The expert finds an "sh" process which started a shell that
wrote the shell file. Starting from that process, they do a forward
trace to find other activities from that "sh" process; this leads to
a socket on a remote computer, with IP 192.168.10.20. ‘forward
select * from * where pid is 24456 ,also, name is sh ‘
Using the steps listed above, the expert is able to reconstruct the
attack’s path. Based on the observed events, the expert concludes
that the intrusion was achieved by creating a backdoor from the
"vsftp" server; by accessing that backdoor, the attacker was able to
drop a shell file into the system and execute it.
6.2.4 System Monitoring. In this task, the administrator is looking
to see if any new executable has been downloaded on the computer
and if they have been used to make changes to the contents of a
file in the system.
• Step 1. The user looks for recent writes to files in the down-
loads directory. "back select write from * where file name has
/home/user1/Downloads/ ,also, date has 2019-02-03"
• Step 2. The user has the list of recently downloaded files. The
next step is to find which one they choose to trace.
• Step 3. The user chooses an executable file and performs a for-
ward trace from that file. "forward select * from * where name is
/home/user1/Downloads/dash".
With the steps mentioned above, the user will obtain a graph that
shows the downloaded files and whether they have made changes
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to other files on that computer. Fig. 13 shows the steps of this
experiment.
7 RELATEDWORKS
Tools such as Elastic Stack are widely adopted in industry and
academia for their agility and high performance when dealing with
logs. Plaso [4] and SOF ELK [28] are two of the tools built on top
of Elastic Stack; these tools have rich visualization and log parsing
features; however, they provide statistics-based reports, do not work
with provenance graph models, and do not provide users with much
queryabilty beyond filtering features. These tools can be highly
effective for monitoring or modeling the system state but are not as
effective when it comes to provenance-tracking forensics querying.
Other tools such as [4, 8, 16] provide models based on artificial
intelligence which will assist the forensics expert in both moni-
toring the system and detecting malicious behaviours based on
known patterns; however, these tools are not designed for manual
forensics tasks such as whole system provenance tracking and are
often bound to one scheme of proprietary data stream. This limits
their application by a human analyst by 1) imposing criteria on the
data they present, such as a limited number of system calls, and 2)
limiting freedom of exploration while querying.
GrAALF is designed to give the user more flexibility in both data
source and data exploration while maintaining features present in
other works such as pattern matching on the streaming data and
provenance tracking capabilities. Table 1 shows an overview of
some related works by their capabilities. We compare these works
by:
• streaming analysis capabilities such as pattern matching or
live monitoring and tracking.
• provenance backward and forward tracking; we use ■ when
tracking on long sequences is possible and □ when the tool
provides tracking functionality but it is not designed for
long sequences from provenance graphs or can do tracking
of events but does not provide a graph representation of
provenance paths.
• flexibility in schema is the ability of the tool to support more
than one type of input; e.g. Elastic Stack can process logs of
arbitrary formats as long as they are provided in a key-value
pair.
• open-sourced and freely available, where □ represents tools
which are partially open-source or provide free versions.
• support for granularity smaller than process, which is unique
to GrAALF and helps prevent dependency explosion; other
similar tools stop their analysis granularity at process or
thread level, but GrAALF supports finer grained units.
• queryability shows whether a tool provides an interface for
users to sort through logs or not; ■ represents presence
of query languages, and □ means there are some filtering
capabilities that are not as advanced as a query language.
• presence of automated anomaly detection capabilities.
We also discuss some related works in more detail below.
SAQL [12] presents an online stream analysis tool that can detect
predefined patterns in a fast stream of data. Patterns in this tool are
defined using a query language that is capable of establishing time
windows and calculating aggregations of events in those windows.
The query language supports the definition of events separately,
then connecting them to form a pattern. While the query language
is very well designed to cover many tasks, the tool lacks constructs
that focus on lineage of events (e.g., backward and forward tracking).
Also, the query language is more complex than GrAALF’s.
AIQL [13] presents a query tool that is capable of querying large
sums of system provenance data. The query language is capable of
backtracking from events in small steps through temporal orders.
The system also provides a window-based aggregation model that
allows users to query for abnormal behaviors, mostly in terms of
frequency of events. The query language in this tool, much like in
[12], is not designed for tracing of long sequences of system events
but instead focuses on events that are within a close circle of foren-
sics steps. Also, the tool works by leveraging a highly optimized
database backend.
Winnower [15] is designed to cluster running tools like docker;
it optimizes storage and reduces nodes by finding common graphs
among different images. This relies on the fact that jobs running
on these machines are heavily repetitive and similar. This allows
the program to prune similar graphs from the network, which
consists of many machines doing the same task. The tool also
uses a query system capable of backward and forward tracking of
provenance graphs with a Cypher-like query grammar. This tool
is more oriented toward tasks with highly repeated components
such as a computer cluster running the same or similar task; this
idea does not apply to realistic program behaviors in an enterprise
today.
Vast [40] focuses on a network-level log paradigm, but does
handle logs in designing a distributed storage system that will keep
and query network events. This system produces a complete graph
of nodes in a distributed fashion where each node maintains an
index and an archive of its own data. HDFS and bitmap index are
being used to store the data and indexes. While GrAALF can work
with a distributed data store as well, the integrity of system logs
prevents us from trusting a computer with its logs; thus logs should
be transported out as fast as possible. The query model in this work
is also less flexible than that of the others.
There exist a number of causality analysis techniques [14, 20–
23] that use system call loggers to record important system events
at runtime and analyze recorded events to find causal relations
between system subjects (e.g., process) and system objects (e.g., file
or network socket). For instance, BackTracker [21] and Taser [14]
propose backward and forward analysis techniques in order to
analyze system call logs and construct causal graphs for effective
attack investigation. Recently, a series of works [25, 26, 30–32]
have proposed to provide accurate and fine-grained attack analy-
sis. They divide long-running processes into multiple autonomous
execution units and identify causal dependencies between them.
LDX [24] proposes a dual execution-based causality inference tech-
nique. When a user executes a process, LDX automatically starts
a slave execution by mutating input sources. Then LDX identi-
fies causal dependencies between the input source and outputs by
comparing the outputs from the original execution and the slave
execution. MCI [25] leverages LDX [24] to build a model-based
causality inference technique for audit logs to infer causal relations
between system calls.
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Figure 11: Attack 1. Graph, node colors represent the step of the investigation they have been added at; red nodes are added
by first query, white nodes in the second, and gray ones in the third query.
Figure 12: Attack 2. Graph, node colors represent the step of the investigation they have been added at; red nodes are added
by first query, white nodes in the second, and gray ones in the third query.
Figure 13: Monitoring Task 1. Graph, node colors represent
the step of the investigation they have been added at; red
nodes are added by first query, white nodes in the second,
and gray ones in the third query.
GrAALF can support all of the proposed logging techniques with
the proper definition of subjects, objects, and relations. We can pro-
cess their logs in real-time and provide GrAALF’s query interface
to the user to enable interactive investigation and monitoring of
the system.
8 CONCLUSION
We present GrAALF, a graphical forensic analysis system for ef-
ficient loading, storing, processing, querying, and displaying of
causal relations extracted from system events to support computer
forensics. GrAALF offers the flexibility of choice between rela-
tional database (e.g., PostgreSQL) and graph database (e.g,. Neo4j)
Table 1: GrAALF Compared to Other Related Works
Title S PG F O G Q A
GrAALF ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ×
AIQL × □ × × × ■ ×
SAQL ■ □ × × × ■ ×
SOF ELK × × □ □ × □ ■
Carbon Black CB LiveOps ■ □ × × × □ ■
NoDoze × □ × × × × ■
Plaso × × □ □ × □ ■
Other common security tools compared to GrAALF by
functionalities S for Streaming Analysis, PG for Provenance Graph
Forward And Backward Tracking, F for Flexibility in Schema, O
for Open-Source, G for Supporting Granularity Smaller than
Process, Q for Queryability of the Graph, and, A for Intelligent
Anomaly Detection. "×" shows lack of support, "□" shows support
with limited functionality, and, "■" shows full support.
for backend storage. GrAALF’s in-memory storage can be seam-
lessly integrated with either backend and provides (near) real-time
forensic analysis of streaming system event logs. GrAALF provides
a simple query language whose syntax and semantics are close
to SQL. The user can simply compose a query to perform a back-
ward and forward analysis to identify causal relations between
system subjects and objects. We use an extensive system call audit
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log that contains realistic attacks to demonstrate the practical util-
ity of GrAALF. We will release the source code of GrAALF as an
open-source software.
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